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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
The rapid expansion over the last decade of Asian corporations
doing business in the United States and U.S. corporations doing business
in Asia, 1 has led to a marked increase in U.S. litigation involving Asian
corporations as parties, requiring discovery of information located in Asia.
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.
* Lynn M. Marvin, Esq. is an experienced litigator and consultant specializing in
electronic discovery, data privacy and information governance at The Law Offices of
Lynn Marvin (www.LMarvinLaw.com).
** Yohance Bowden is a New York litigator with significant experience representing
clients in products liability matters including data privacy and cross-border discovery
issues. The authors would like to thank Camaron Voyles, J.D. 2014 cum laude,
University of Michigan Law School for his invaluable research assistance.
1

For example, the “[t]otal U.S.-China trade rose from $5 billion in 1981 to $503 billion
in 2012” and as of late-2013 China was the U.S.’ second-largest trading partner and thirdlargest export market. See Joseph D. Gustavus, What U.S. and Chinese Companies Need
to Know About U.S. Export Control Laws Applicable to China, MILLER CANFIELD (Nov.
2013), http://www.millercanfield.com/resources-341.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/R2C9-6THT (citing WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 2 (2012), available at
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=727519, archived at https://perma.cc/BU4B-NH9N).
As of the end of 2013, China was the largest importer of goods and services to the Unites
States and Japan the fourth largest. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES BY SELECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS,
1999–PRESENT, available at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#trade, archived
at http://perma.cc/5F26-FW7N.
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trade of goods and services with countries in the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (“APEC”) totaled $2.9 trillion in 2013: exports totaled $1.2
trillion and imports totaled $1.6 trillion. 2 It naturally follows that Asian
corporations doing business in the United States are utilizing the American
court system to enforce their own rights, and are also finding themselves
subject to the jurisdiction of American courts on a more frequent basis.
Additionally, even if a party to the litigation is not a foreign party, U.S.
litigants are now finding it necessary to conduct discovery abroad because
of the multinational scope of business, and because of the rapid growth of
data, invention of new technologies, and resulting corporate data and
record storage polices, which allow relevant information to be stored
abroad.3
[2]
Conducting cross-border discovery is never an easy task for a U.S.
litigant. Parties must first determine whether U.S. law entitles them to
conduct discovery abroad and which laws are applicable. 4 Not only must
they contend with legal challenges, but also with logistical challenges
from the U.S. courts—such as scheduling issues relating to the time
2

OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., U.S.-APEC BILATERAL TRADE AND INV., available at
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/apec/us-apec-trade-facts#, archived at
https://perma.cc/982E-7VG4 (identifying APEC Member Economies as: Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Republic of the
Philippines, The Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the U.S., and
Vietnam).
3

See Bill MacMinn, Deciphering the Hague Convention: A Primer on Conducting
Discovery Abroad, ANTHEIL MASLOW & MACMINN, LLP (July 30, 2014, 2:00 PM),
https://www.ammlaw.com/blog/deciphering-the-hague-convention-a-primer-onconducting-discovery-abroad.html, archived at https://perma.cc/ES9W-XWD7.
4

See Rob Hellewell & Michelle Mattei, Behind the Great Firewall of Ediscovery in Asia,
ACC DOCKET 27 (Sept. 2014),
http://www.acc.com/vl/public/ACCDocketArticle/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile
&pageid=1375727&page=/legalresources/resource.cfm&qstring=show=1375727&title=
Behind%20the%20Great%20Firewall%20of%20eDiscovery%20in%20Asia, archived at
http://perma.cc/F9M7-9GTZ.
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involved in taking discovery abroad.5 Often parties are caught in a “catch22”, where a court orders discovery abroad from a foreign party, but
compliance would force that party to violate the foreign country’s privacy
regulations while non-compliance would bring about sanctions from the
U.S. court.6
[3]
Once the U.S.-specific challenges are met, the challenges relating
to conducting discovery IN the foreign country must be faced. Parties
needing to conduct discovery in Asia are met with a special set of
challenges. Unlike in Europe, which has a comprehensive set of laws
governing data privacy regulations, those conducting discovery in Asia
quickly learn that Asia lacks such a comprehensive set of guidelines. In
Asia, each country must be looked at individually to determine what rules
govern discovery in that specific country, including applicable blocking
statutes that may restrict the transfer of personal data.7
[4]
In addition to country-specific blocking statutes, a further
challenge for U.S. litigators is that the data privacy and discovery laws of
individual Asian countries are generally much less developed than their
European counterparts, and are constantly being developed and updated. 8
A law in a specific Asian country last year very well may have been
replaced by an entirely new set of data privacy laws this year. 9 For
example, from 2012–2014, “five countries have enacted brand new
[privacy] laws, and three countries or jurisdictions have amended existing

5

See id. at 27.

6

See id. at 27–28.

7

See id. at 28.

8

See Cynthia Rich, Privacy Laws in Asia, 13 BNA INSIGHTS 674, 674 (2014) available
at http://www.bna.com/data-protection-privacy-m17179918821/#, archived at
http://perma.cc/APX9-EVCJ.
9

See id.
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laws.”10 As of the end of 2014, the following jurisdictions in Asia now
have comprehensive data privacy laws: Australia (amended), Hong Kong
(amended), India (new), Japan, Macao, Malaysia (new), New Zealand, the
Philippines (new), Singapore (new), South Korea (new), and Taiwan
(amended).11 Further, it has been noted that
[T]his decade has been the most intensive period of
expansion in the 40-year history, with an average of over
five new laws per year for 2010–2014. If such expansion
continues, 50 new laws will bring the total to 140 or more
by 2020 and as many as 80 new laws this decade. 12
Because “[t]here is little room for expansion [of data privacy laws] within
Europe,[ ]the majority of the world’s data privacy laws will soon be found
outside Europe, probably by 2015”.13
[5]
Besides the legal challenges of looking to country specific data
privacy and protection laws, discovery regulations and blocking statutes,
Asian countries also have a unique set of technical challenges because of
Asian language characters and complex IT firewalls. 14 While this paper
does not specifically address those technical challenges, the practitioner
must be aware of such challenges, and keep them in mind when planning
for discovery abroad and making a discovery schedule.
[6]
This paper provides an overview of U.S. law relating to the taking
of discovery abroad in Section II. It then goes on to discuss the current
10

Id.

11

See id.

12

GRAHAM GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE & HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVES7 (1st ed. 2014).
13

Id.

14

See Hellewell & Mattei, supra note 4, at 38.
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state of the law in Asia as a whole under APEC and individual countries in
Asia as of the time of this writing in Section III. It is necessary to
understand each set of country-specific regulations relating to data
collection, processing, and exportation as well as other discovery in order
to determine how best to proceed with discovery. It concludes with the
most important take away—that it is essential that the U.S. attorney
conducting discovery in Asia consult with competent counsel in the
specific Asian country and work with a vendor familiar with that country
to conduct discovery.
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. LAW RELATING TO TAKING DISCOVERY ABROAD
[7]
The continued spread of global business and transactions means
that U.S. courts will continue to hear disputes involving parties located in
different countries. The duty to disclose evidence applies to parties
regardless of whether they are located in the U.S. or abroad. In most
countries, unlike the U.S., civil law systems are in place—where any pretrial exchange of information is restricted to very narrowly tailored
disclosures, far less than the volumes of information that are often
disclosed by parties in U.S. litigation. There are roughly twice as many
civil law countries (about 150) as there are common law countries (about
eighty) in the world.15 Many civil law jurisdictions go so far as to restrict
pretrial discovery to the point where judicial approval is required. In
contrast, U.S. rules permit parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.”16 In the U.S.,
it is axiomatic that “the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.”17
15

See The World Factbook, Field Listing: Legal System, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html, archived
at https://perma.cc/BHV7-9XLD (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
16

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

17

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 331 (1950)).
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Accordingly, the U.S. judicial system has discovery rules that facilitate the
gathering of the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
trial. 18 U.S. discovery requests need only be “reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”. 19 Unlike in many civil law
countries, in the U.S. there is no general right of privacy that can be
asserted to limit pre-trial disclosure of information.
A. How and When to Use the Hague Evidence Convention:
Letters Rogatory and Letters of Request
[8]
The 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Evidence Convention” or “Hague
Convention”) is a cornerstone of international litigation practice. The
Hague Evidence Convention facilitates pre-trial discovery in litigation by
allowing the exchange of letters rogatory and letters of request between
countries without having to rely on cumbersome diplomatic channels to
obtain evidence necessary for trial. 20 “Letters rogatory are requests from
courts in one country to the courts of another country requesting the
performance of an act which, if done without the sanction of the foreign
court, could constitute a violation of that country’s sovereignty.”21 The
U.S., along with nearly sixty other countries, is a signatory to the Hague
Evidence Convention. 22 Per Article 1, the Hague Evidence Convention
18

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

19

Id.

20

See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, art. 1, Mar. 18, 1970, available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt20en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CTH32VAJ.
21

Preparation of Letters Rogatory, U.S DEP’T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legal-considerations/judicial/obtainingevidence/preparation-letters-rogatory.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4L9E-KXEW
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
22

See Status Table 20: Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters, HCCH,
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permits evidence to be transmitted to other countries via letters of request
or letters rogatory.23 When deciding whether to proceed with cross-border
discovery under the Hague Evidence Convention or the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, U.S. courts must perform an analysis of the relative
interests of each country involved based on comity—a doctrine whereby
courts in one country try to avoid infringing on the interests of a foreign
country, in the interest of international respect. 24
[9]
Under the Hague Evidence Convention, the U.S. court where the
action is pending sends a letter of request to the proper authority in the
foreign jurisdiction where the discovery is located, which then forwards
the letter to competent local judicial authorities for execution. 25 This
process is often time-consuming, and sometimes impractical. Importantly,
however, Chapter II of the Convention outlines a procedure in which an
appointed commissioner or other official transfers a set of documents
agreed to by the parties to a foreign jurisdiction for use in foreign
proceedings.26 This process can save significant time and is expected to
be used with greater frequency by U.S. litigants. 27
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82, archived at
http://perma.cc/HMK7-SD6H (last updated June 8, 2014) [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention Status Table].
23

See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, supra note 20.
24

See Comity, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comity (last visited
Apr. 10, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/2M2W-QZPS.
25.

See Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts, 2 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. §
18:92 (2005); see also The Impact on U.S. Discovery of EU Data Protection and
Discovery Blocking Statutes, HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP 12 (2013),
http://www.hugheshubbard.com/Documents/Impact_on_U_S_Discovery_of_EU_Data_P
rotection_and_Discovery_Blocking_Statutes.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A9Y7SXUR.
26

See The Impact on U.S. Discovery of EU Data Protection and Discovery Blocking
Statutes, supra note 25, at 12–13.
27

See id. at 13.
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[10] Under Article 11 of Chapter I of the Convention, a party from
whom documents are requested can claim a privilege under the law of
either the requesting state or the state receiving the letter of request (or
“the executing state”). Letters of request are requests for foreign judicial
assistance sent through the U.S. State Department and are a timeconsuming means of obtaining discovery. 28 Execution of a letter of
request can take a year or more. The U.S. State Department website is a
reliable resource for information on how to properly draft a letter of
request.29
[11] Use of the Hague Evidence Convention is often not a
straightforward process. This is because a great number of Hague
Evidence Convention signatories have exercised their right not to execute
letters of request from “common law countries” in connection with
discovery using an “Article 23 Reservation.” 30 Other signatories have
reserved the right to limit the letters of requests to specifically tailored
requests seeking narrow categories of information. 31 Some countries have
gone further and enacted blocking statutes to compel parties seeking
discovery within their borders to comply with the Hague Evidence
Convention. For example, under France’s Law 80-538, enacted on July 6,
1980, a person who transmits “documents or information relating to
economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters” outside
the Hague Evidence Convention framework for use in foreign judicial or

28

See 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(1)–(2) (2012).

29

The U.S. State Dept. resource allowing you to make a proper draft of request is
available at http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legalconsiderations/judicial/obtaining-evidence/preparation-letters-rogatory.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/4L9E-KXEW.
30

See Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts, 2 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG.,
supra note 25, § 18:92.
31

See id.
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administrative proceedings is subject to fine or imprisonment.32
B. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Société Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court
[12] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 26 provides that U.S.
district courts “may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action.” 33 This authority is not restricted by
geography, therefore, foreign countries are included. Parties to litigation
are subject to discovery requests regardless of their location, and failure to
comply is punishable with sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 37(b). Nonparties located abroad are also subject to discovery
requests but generally through alternate means—the Hague Evidence
Convention and letters rogatory, discussed above. Document production
can also be compelled when the U.S. court has jurisdiction over the nonparty or if the non-party is a U.S. citizen.
[13] In Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
France’s blocking statute did not “deprive [an] American court of the
power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even
though the act of production may violate that statute.”34 The Court found
that the Hague Evidence Convention contained no language that could be
construed to mandate exclusive use of the Convention when U.S. litigants
are seeking discovery from a foreign jurisdiction. 35 The Court was careful
to note that both Chapters I and II “use permissive rather than mandatory

32

France’s Law 80-538, enacted on July 6, 1980, which amended Law 68-678 (July 26,
1968).
33

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

34

Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 544 n.29 (1987).
35

See id. at 537–38.
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language.”36 Then, citing an absence of explicit textual support, the Court
decided it was unable to accept the theory that the common law countries
that had signed onto the Convention agreed to replace their own discovery
procedures in the context of cross-border litigation.37
[14] In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court instructed U.S. Courts to
balance a number of factors in deciding whether to order cross-border
discovery. 38 These factors include:
(1) the importance to the litigation of the documents or
other information requested, (2) the degree of specificity of
the request, (3) whether the information originated in the
United States, (4) the availability of alternative means of
securing the information, and (5) the extent to which
noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with
the request would undermine important interests of the
nation where the information is located.39
The Aerospatiale Court found that it had authority to order discovery to

36

Article 1 provides that a judicial authority in one contracting state
‘may’ forward a letter of request to the competent authority in another
contracting state for the purpose of obtaining evidence. Similarly,
Articles 15, 16, and 17 provide that diplomatic officers, consular agents
and commissioners ‘may . . . without compulsion,’ take evidence under
certain conditions.”

Id. at 535.
37

See id. at 537–38.

38

See id. at 544 n.28.

39

Société Nationale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 437(1)(c) (1987)).
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proceed under the Federal Rules.40
C. Other U.S. Case Law and Judicial Orders
[15] Since Aerospatiale, U.S. courts have overwhelmingly required
production notwithstanding blocking statutes.41 Blocking statutes are used
by many countries to prevent documents from being sent to the U.S. for
discovery proceedings. Many litigants in U.S. courts with documents
located abroad have argued that local blocking statutes prohibit them from
complying with U.S. discovery requests, only for the court to hold that the
U.S. interest in determining the truth through complete discovery
outweighs the interests of the party with documents abroad in complying
40

There are generally four ways in which a U.S. court might compel someone located in
another country to produce documents in U.S. litigation using the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP):
(1) Through FRCP 34, compel production of documents located abroad
if the court has in personam jurisdiction over the party in “possession,
custody, or control” of the documents. FED R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
(2) Via FRCP 34(c), compel production of documents located abroad
under the control of the non-party. See FED R. CIV. P. 34(c).
(3) Through a FRCP 45 subpoena duces tecum, compel production of
documents from foreign entities over which the U.S. court has in
personam jurisdiction. See FED R. CIV. P. 45(d).
(4) Compel consent to produce third party documents whose disclosure
is restricted by bank secrecy laws. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S.
201, 203, 215 (1988).
41

See, e.g., BrightEdge Techs., Inc. v. Searchmetrics, GmbH Inc., No. 14-cv-01009WHO (MEJ), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112377, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014); In re Air
Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010);
In re Global Power Equip. Group, 418 B.R. 833, 851 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); Filler v.
Lernout, 218 F.R.D. 348, 352–53 (D. Mass. 2003). But see Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v.
Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F.Supp.2d 323, 337 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011) (finding that
Switzerland’s sovereign interest in protecting the privacy of requested bank records
located there required use of the Hague Convention).

11

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 4

with the blocking statute.42 For example, after a French court imposed
criminal sanctions in 2007 on a French attorney who sought information in
connection with U.S. discovery efforts, it seemed possible that U.S. judges
would begin treating objections to discovery abroad with more deference
to the privacy and other concerns of foreign countries. 43 However, while
more U.S. courts are considering blocking statute arguments, they
continue to rule in favor of producing foreign information in the U.S. per
the Federal Rules, despite any blocking statutes.44
[16] For an example of how U.S. courts typically handle objections to
cross-border discovery based on blocking statutes, we can look to the
Northern District of California. In the case in re Cathode Ray Tube,
plaintiffs brought antitrust claims against Thomson SA, a company that
had documents located in France.45 When plaintiffs requested production
of the French documents, Thomson objected on grounds that the French
blocking statute required use of the Hague Evidence Convention and
furthermore, the discovery request was overbroad and not in compliance
with the Hague Evidence Convention.46 The court analyzed the request
42

See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 227–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2007);
In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571 (RJH) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 85211, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2006) (citations omitted) (“On closer
examination of [the] French [blocking statute] . . . the . . . history of the statute gives
strong indications that it was never expected nor intended to be enforced against French
subjects but was intended rather to be provide them with tactical weapons and bargaining
chips in foreign courts . . . . Therefore, France’s real interest in promulgating [the
blocking statute] are dwarfed by American interests in complete discovery.”); Madden v.
Wyeth, No. 3-03-CV-0167-BD, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 880, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2006).
43

See In re Advocate Christopher X, 7 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
L.R. 130, 132 (2010) (translating Cour de cassation [Cass. Crim.] [Supreme Court for
Judicial Matters, Criminal Division] Dec. 12, 2007, Bull. Crim., 7168 (Fr.)).
44

See e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *18; Madden, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 880, at *7.
45

See In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-5944-SC, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 151222, at *47 (N. D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014).
46

Id. at *56–57.
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under the five factors from Aerospatiale and concluded that (a) the
discovery sought—Thomson’s communications and meetings with
competitors—was highly significant to the litigation, (b) many if not most
of the plaintiffs’ requests were narrowly-tailored and fell far short of
“generalized searches for information,” (c) the documents sought were not
available through means other than the Federal Rules, as a practical
matter, since attempts to obtain discovery in France through the Hague
Evidence Convention usually resulted in very slow and often
unsatisfactory results, 47 (d) the national interest of the U.S. enforcement of
its antitrust laws is significantly stronger than France’s interest in
controlling foreign access to information within its borders, and (e) the
blocking statute does not subject the defendant to a realistic risk of
prosecution. 48 The court further determined that a look at legislative
history of the French blocking statute suggests that the statute was never
intended to be enforced against French citizens but instead was meant to
be a bargaining chip in foreign courts.49 The court found that those factors
weighed in favor of permitting discovery to go forward in France pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and granted the plaintiffs’ motion
to compel discovery. 50
[17] In another significant case dealing with cross-border discovery
issues, Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais illustrated that litigants in U.S. courts
should expect to have to produce documents pursuant to the Federal Rules
despite the existence of foreign laws prohibiting discovery, even if those
laws are enforced.51 Shortly after the Christopher X decision in 2007, the
47

See Am. Bar Ass’n, Int’l Litig. Comm., Section of Int’l L. & Prac., Report on Survey of
Experience of U.S. Lawyers with the Hague Evidence Convention Letter of Request
Procedures, 7, 10–11, n.16 (Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter ABA Report], available at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/lse_20us.pdf.
48

In re Cathode, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151222, at *57–64 (citations omitted).

49

See id. at *64 (quoting Adidas Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, 80 Civ. 1911 (PNL) 82
Civ. 0375 (PNL), 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984).
50

See id. at *57–59.
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plaintiffs in Strauss claimed that the French bank Credit Lyonnais was
liable for providing material support and resources to a terrorist
organization, along with providing and collecting funds with the
knowledge that such funds would be used to support terrorism. 52 The
French defendant objected to the plaintiffs’ discovery request based on
Article 1 of French privacy law—which prohibits the disclosure of
documents in connection with a foreign judicial proceeding. 53 The
defendant argued that discovery should follow the Hague Evidence
Convention. 54 The defendant also argued that the requested discovery
would violate French laws prohibiting disclosure of information relating to
bank accounts and criminal investigations.55 The U.S. court analyzed the
arguments using the Aerospatiale factors and determined that the Hague
Evidence Convention was too cumbersome under the circumstances and
the factors favored production of the documents pursuant to the federal
rules. 56
[18] In reaching its decision, the Strauss court looked at the Third
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Section
442(1)(c) of the Restatement provides useful guidelines to U.S. courts
faced with a dispute over whether documents located abroad should be
produced over a foreign bank secrecy law or other blocking statute. It
states:
In deciding whether to issue an order directing production
of information located abroad and in framing such an order,
51

See Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D 199, 213 (E.D.N.Y May 25, 2007).

52

See id. at 205.

53

See id. at 206.

54

See id.

55

See id. at 206.

56

See Strauss, 242 F.R.D at 213.
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a court or agency in the United States should take into
account the importance to the investigation or litigation of
the documents or other information requested, the degree of
specificity of the request, whether the information
originated in the United States the availability of alternative
means of securing the information, and the extent to which
non-compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the State where the information is
located.57
[19] The Strauss court took the following approach, based on the
factors found in section 442(1)(c) of the Restatement:
•

•

•
•

•

“The importance of the sought information to the
litigation”;
– Meaning relevant and important to the claims and
defenses
“Degree of specificity of the request”;
– Focused on vital issues, for example, whether
Credit Lyonnais knowingly provided information to
a designated terrorist organization
“Whether the information requested originated in the
U.S.”;
– In this case, it did not
“Availability of alternative means of securing the
information”;
– Per Aerospatiale, plaintiffs are not required to use
Hague Evidence Convention as only or even first
resort
“Extent to which non-compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the U.S.”;
– The U.S. and France share a mutual interest in
fighting terrorism which outweighs the French
privacy interest in connection with discovery in this

57

See id. at 213 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442
(1987)).
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case
Both the U.S. and France have signed onto treaties
aimed at disrupting financing of terrorism
The greater of the competing interests of the countries
whose laws are in conflict;
Hardship of compliance on the party from whom
discovery is sought.
– Credit Lyonnais would not face substantial hardship
by complying with Plaintiffs’ requests
– There is no evidence that Credit Lyonnais will be
sued in civil court or charged with a crime for
compliance. 58
–

•
•

[20] However, U.S. courts do not always rule in favor of production of
data located abroad. In In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, a district court
found that German privacy laws presented legitimate privacy law concerns
and stating that “individuals have a presumptively legitimate interest
under German law in the nondisclosure of their personal information to
residents of countries with non-equivalent personal data protection
standards.”59
D. Comity
[21] Comity is the doctrine under which the judicial system of one
country tries to avoid taking action that infringes on the laws and interests
of another country. 60 In Wultz v. Bank of China, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has set forth seven comity factors for U.S.
courts to consider, based on the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations
58

Id. at 210 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c)
(1987)).
59

In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 99-197 (TFH), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8904,
at *52 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001).
60

See LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 24.
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Law, Section 442(1)(c) and case law:
(1) the importance to the investigation or litigation of the
documents or other information requested; (2) the degree of
specificity of the request; (3) whether the information
originated in the United States; (4) the availability of
alternative means of securing the information[, such as the
Hague Convention]; (5) the extent to which noncompliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the
United States, or compliance would undermine important
interests of the state where the information is located[;] (6)
the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from
whom discovery is sought; and (7) the good faith of the
party resisting discovery. 61
E. Other Treaties
[22] Other treaties used for pre-trial disclosure of information include
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”). MLATs are treaties used
for obtaining evidence in a foreign country in criminal matters and cannot
be used in civil matters. 62 The MLAT process is available only to
prosecutors or other government officials. MLATs are generally regarded
as less time-consuming than letters rogatory, which are seen as slow and
cumbersome. MLATs to which the U.S. is a party include the 2000 U.N.
Convention Against Corruption and the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 63
[23]

Parties engaging in discovery abroad need to carefully consider

61

See Wultz v. Bank of China, No. 11-CV-1266, 298 F.R.D. 91, 96 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
2014) (footnote omitted).
62

2012 INCSR: Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/2DTV-BJXK (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
63

See id.
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what other conventions might apply in their litigation. For example, the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) 64 and the Export
Administration Regulations (“EAR”) 65 are two export-related U.S.
regulations that could impact the ability to move data freely across
national borders in litigation.
III. CURRENT STATE OF PRIVACY LAW IN ASIA
A. APEC Privacy Framework
[24] APEC is “a regional economic forum established in 1989 to
leverage the growing interdependence of the Asia-Pacific.”66 It consists of
twenty-one member nations67 with the “aim to create greater prosperity for
the people of the region by promoting balanced, inclusive, sustainable,
innovative and secure growth and by accelerating regional economic
integration.”68 In recent years, the Data Privacy Subgroup (“DPS”) of the
Electronic Commerce Steering Group of APEC has been particularly
active, working to establish a common APEC approach to data privacy.69
64

See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–30 (2012).

65

See 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–74 (2012).

66

About APEC, What Is Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation?, APEC,
http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/4VP5PFMP (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
67

The member nations include: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People’s
Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese
Tapiei, Thailand, The Unites States, and Vietnam. See Member Economies, APEC,
http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/H6GU-YVC6 (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
68

About APEC, supra note 66.

69

See Electronic Commerce Steering Group, APEC,
http://www.apec.org/Home/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/ElectronicCommerce-Steering-Group.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/HA52-J4C6 (last visited
Apr. 14, 2015); see also TAMMY L. HREDZAK & AZUL OGAZON GOMEZ, ASIA-PACIFIC
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In 2004, the APEC Ministers endorsed the APEC Privacy Framework, a
voluntary framework for member economies, the stated purpose of which
is to “promote . . . a flexible approach to information privacy protection
across APEC Member Economies, while avoiding the creation of
unnecessary barriers to information flows.” 70 The Framework “provide[s]
clear guidance and direction to businesses in APEC economies on
common privacy issues and the impact of privacy issues upon the way
legitimate businesses are conducted.” 71 It spells out nine specific
information privacy principles which consist of: (1) Preventing Harm; (2)
Notice; (3) Collection Limitation; (4) Uses of Personal Information; (5)
Choice; (6) Integrity of Personal Information; (7) Security Safeguards; (8)
Access and Correction; and (9) Accountability. 72 It also provides
guidance for member economies on implementing the privacy
framework.73 As of 2011, eleven member economies had indicated they
“actively considered the APEC Privacy Framework while developing or
modifying their domestic data privacy legislation.” 74
[25] In November 2011, APEC implemented the APEC Cross Border
Privacy Rules System (“CBPR”). 75 The CBPR “balances the flow of
ECONOMIC COOPERATION POLICY SUPPORT UNIT, ENABLING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
THE CONTRIBUTION OF APEC’S DATA PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 13 (2011), available at
http://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1205, archived at
http://perma.cc/UK8U-K4W2.
70

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2005),
available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-andInvestment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx, archived at
http://perma.cc/7SMB-K8C9.
71

Id. at 4.

72

See id. at 11–30.

73

See id. at 30–36.

74

HREDZAK & GOMEZ, supra note 69, at v.

75

See supra note 69.
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information and data across borders while at the same time providing
effective protection for personal information, essential to trust and
confidence in the online marketplace.” 76 Under the system, privacy
policies and practices of companies operating in the APEC region are
assessed and certified by a third party and demonstrated as following a set
of commonly-agreed upon rules, based on the APEC Privacy
Framework. 77 “The CBPR System consists of four elements: (1) selfassessment; (2) compliance review; (3) recognition/acceptance; and (4)
dispute resolution and enforcement.”78
[26] According to CBPR guidelines, “[t]he CBPR System does not
displace or change an Economy’s domestic laws and regulations. Where
there are no applicable domestic privacy protection requirements in an
Economy, the CBPR System is intended to provide a minimum level of
protection.”79 Currently, the U.S., Mexico and Japan are now part of the
system and Canada will be submitting its notice of intent to participate
soon.80
[27] The APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules System Intake
Questionnaire specifically notes in the “Qualifications to the Provision of
Notice” and “Qualifications to the Provision of Choice Mechanisms” that
notice “may not be necessary or practical” when disclosure is made
“pursuant to a lawful form of process” by a personal information
76

Id.

77

See id.

78

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC CROSS-BORDER PRIVACY RULES
SYSTEM 4 (2011), available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-andInvestment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/CBPR/CBPR-PoliciesRulesGuidelines.ashx,
archived at http://perma.cc/VZF8-LZ9W.
79

Id. at 10.

80

See APEC Privacy Update – Beijing Meetings, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG
(Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/08/13/apec-privacy-updatebeijing-meetings/, archived at https://perma.cc/AFY5-WMJE.
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controller such as a “discovery request made in the course of a civil
litigation.”81 It therefore appears that the CBPR may allow for a more
streamlined approach to cross border discovery between member
economies.
[28] While APEC provides guidance to its member economies in
implementing privacy legislation and may in the future provide more
streamlined means for accessing data in discovery proceedings in the U.S.,
for the U.S. litigator it currently does not provide any black letter law
upon which a U.S. attorney may hang his hat to access data in member
economies. While the U.S. litigator must be aware and keep up with the
ever changing guidance from APEC, it is critical that U.S. litigators
seeking discovery in Asia look to the individual country laws from which
they are seeking discovery, as discussed in more detail in Section B below.
B. Country Specific Rules
1. China
[29] Unlike the European Union or Hong Kong, China has no central
framework for handling data protection or discovery. Instead, state
81

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC CROSS-BORDER PRIVACY RULES
SYSTEM INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE 6, 11–12, available at
http://www.apec.org/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/CBPR/CBPR-IntakeQuestionnaire.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GUV7-2NRE (stating for “Qualifications
to the Provision Notice[:]” “[t]he following are situations in which the application at the
time of collection of the APEC Notice Principle may not be necessary or practical. . . .
Disclosure to a third party pursuant to a lawful form of process: Personal information
controllers do not need to provide notice of disclosure to a third party when such
disclosure was requested pursuant to a lawful form of process such as a discovery request
made in the course of civil litigation.” For “Qualifications to the Provision of Choice
Mechanisms,” “[t]he following are situations in which the application of the APEC
Choice Principle may not be necessary or practical. . . . Disclosure to a third party
pursuant to a lawful form of process: Personal information controllers do not need to
provide a mechanism for individuals to exercise choice in relation to the disclosure to a
third party when such disclosure was requested pursuant to a lawful form of process such
as a discovery request made in the course of civil litigation.”).
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secrecy statutes and sector-specific laws applying to certain types of data
regulate the processing and transfer of sensitive data, including economic
and health-related data. Though China has no EU-style comprehensive
data protection law, do not be lulled into complacency. The shear breadth
of China’s state secrecy laws requires anyone seeking to conduct
discovery in China to proceed with caution. The most important step of
taking discovery in China is to become aware of the relevant laws by
hiring local counsel. Discussions of China in this paper refer to the
People’s Republic of China and do not include Hong Kong.
a. Hague Signatory Status
[30] China is a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention, with a
limited Article 23 reservation, pursuant to which it will allow discovery to
proceed only when clearly enumerated in a Letter of Request. 82
b. Collection, Processing and Transfer of Data
for Purposes of U.S. Discovery
[31] Chinese law on discovery is often vague, with prohibitions against
the processing or transfer of seemingly very broad categories of data,
particularly under China’s State Secrets Law. However, there are general
principles that should guide a U.S. litigator’s behavior when seeking
discovery in China. Generally, discovery and handling of personal
information in China is broadly governed by principles of “legitimacy,
rightfulness and necessity.” 83 Under Chinese law, any legal entity seeking
to collect and use personal information in China is generally required to:
•
82

Specify and adhere to their own collection policies defining the

See Hague Evidence Convention Status Table, supra note 22.

83

See MARISSA ZIAO DONG, Data Protection in China: Overview, in DATA PROTECTION
MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE 2014/15 (2014), available at
http://us.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf
&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1247989241845&ssbinary=true,
archived at http://perma.cc/C9MY-DJ6H.
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scope and purpose of the collection and use of data;
Gain consent from the data subject; consent is necessary when a
third party seeks to process the data as well (it is unclear whether
consent must be implied or express);
Maintain confidentiality of personal information and ensure that
personal information is not disclosed, sold or provided to third
parties in violation of Chinese law. 84

[32] Furthermore, in February 2013, a non-obligatory guideline went
into effect stating “information collectors should [gain] permission before
collecting and using a [Chinese] person’s sensitive private information.”85
The standard, described on the China Internet Network Information Center
website as the first of its kind in China, is not named or cited.86
[33] As of the publication of this article there is no general regulation
against cross-border data transfers outside of China. 87 However, sectorspecific rules relating to data collected by banks require the data to be
stored and processed in China and cross border transfer of any data
considered a state secret is strictly prohibited. 88
[34] Personal information under Chinese law is defined by the
Regulation on Personal Information Protection of Telecom and Internet
Users (“MIIT Regulation”) as:

84

See id.

85

China to Enforce First Privacy Protection Standard, CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFO.
CENTER (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://www1.cnnic.cn/ScientificResearch/LeadingEdge/hlwzcyj/zcfg/201302/t20130222_
38851.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/LNJ8-Y7F5.
86

See id.

87

See Dong, supra note 83.

88

See id.
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Information that can be used to identify the user (including,
name, date of birth, identification number, address,
telephone number and account numbers and associated
passwords) when used independently or when combined
with other information; and [i]nformation that concerns the
time and location of the users’ use of service that is
collected by telecom business operators and Internet
information service providers during their provision of
services. 89
[35] The MIIT Regulation took effect in September 2013 and imposes
relatively small fines of no more than 30,000 yuan (approximately
US$4,800) for violation of any one of the Articles. 90
[36] The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State
Secrets (“State Secrets Law”) restricts transfer of certain data in the
control of government entities, which includes state-owned enterprises,
interpreted to include almost any company in China. 91 State secrets are
defined quite broadly in Article 8 of the State Secrets Law—ranging from
merely vague “(1) secrets concerning major policy decisions on State
affairs[,]” to the potentially all-encompassing “(4) secrets in national
economic and social development.”92 Per Article 26 of the State Secrets
89

Id.

90

See Telecommunications and Internet Personal User Data Protection Regulations,
CHINA COPYRIGHT & MEDIA (July 16, 2013),
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/telecommunications-andinternet-user-individual-information-protection-regulations/, archived at
https://perma.cc/3QY6-NM2M.
91

See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets, (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Sept. 5, 1998, effective as of May 1, 1989), art. 1
[hereinafter State Secrets Law], available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383925.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/PS7W-ASQ3.
92

State Secrets Law art. 8(1), (4).
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law, cross-border transfer of any document considered a state secret is not
permitted without approval of “competent departments.”93 The penalty for
violating Article 26 of the State Secrets Law can be severe. Per Article
111 of the Criminal Law, illegally providing state secrets to an
organization outside the country is punishable by five years to life in
prison.94 Legal recourse against privacy infringement in China is provided
by the Civil Code and Tort Liability Law. 95
[37] The Standing Committee of China’s top legislative body, the
National People’s Congress (“NPC”) in 2012, passed the NPC Decision
on Strengthening Network Information Protection (“NPC Decision”). 96
Per the NPC’s explanatory notes, the Decision will “protect network
information security, protect the lawful interests of citizens, legal persons
and other organizations,” and “safeguard national security and the public
social interest.”97 The key provisions of the NPC Decision from a privacy
standpoint are Articles 1 and 2, which hold that the Chinese government
protects personally identifiable e-data by requiring ISPs (a) to state clearly
“the purposes, methods, and scope of collection and use of” the personal
data of Chinese citizens, (b) to get consent from the data subject and (c) to
publicize their rules for collection and use of personal e-data.98
93

Id. at art. 26.

94

See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1919) art. 111, available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/7GE8-LWG8.
95

See Dong, supra note 83.

96

See Laney Zhang, China: NPC Decision on Network Information Protection, LIBR. OF
CONGRESS GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR,
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403445_text, archived at
http://perma.cc/C34C-V6DD (last updated Jan. 4, 2013).
97

Id.

98

Id.
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[38] The NPC Decision goes further by requiring ISPs to strictly
preserve the secrecy of citizens’ collected personal e-data and to not
divulge or distort the data.99 Under the NPC Decision ISPs are required to
employ technical measures to ensure information security and prevent loss
or disclosure of personal data.100
[39] Other articles of the NPC Decision regulate advertising and give
Chinese citizens the right to report to the government unlawful acts of
stealing personal e-data or illegally providing data to other parties.101
[40] Additionally, sector-specific laws regulate the handling of various
types of personal information.
For example, the Measures for
Administration of Population Health Information (PHI Measures) went
into effect in May 2014. 102 The PHI Measures apply to the collection, use
and management of “population health information,” defined as (i) basic
demographic information, (ii) medical and health care services
information and (iii) other electronic health and medical records. 103 The
core principles of narrow collection, security safeguards and data quality
are found in the PHI Measures. 104 However, note that this regulation
appears to apply only to “Responsible Entities,” defined as “[m]edical,

99

See id.

100

See id.

101

See Zhang, supra note 96.

102

See Eric Carlson & Scott Livingston, New Chinese Requirements on Management of
Health Information, 14 WORLD DATA PROTECTION REP., July 2014, at 13, 13.
103

Interpretation on Population Health Information Management Measures (Trial
Implementation), CHINADAILY.COM.CN,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinahealth/2014-06/15/content_17588400.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/4E66-XYS5 (last updated June 15, 2014).
104

See also Carlson & Livingston, supra note 102, at 14.

26

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 4

health care and family planning service agencies.”105

c. Depositions in China
[41]

Taking depositions in China is strictly prohibited. 106
2. Hong Kong
a. Hague Signatory Status

[42] Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) of the
People’s Republic of China and the Hague Evidence Convention remains
in effect for Hong Kong.107
b. Collection, Processing and Transfer of Data
for Purposes of U.S. Discovery
i. Current Hong Kong Regulations
[43] In 1995, Hong Kong became the second jurisdiction in Asia to
enact a comprehensive data protection law. 108 The Personal Data
105

Marissa Xiao Dong, China – Protection of Personal Information, CONVENTUS LAW
(July 31, 2014), http://www.conventuslaw.com/china-protection-of-personalinformation/, archived at http://perma.cc/4APM-KVYS; see also Carlson & Livingston,
supra note 102, at 14.
106

See Legal Considerations - China, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legalconsiderations/judicial/country/china.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N6H6-HJNJ (last
updated Nov. 15, 2013).
107

Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
supra note 20.
108

See Rich, supra note 8, at 675.
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(Privacy) Ordinance (“Hong Kong Privacy Law”) is designed to protect
the rights of an individual’s personal data.109 Like many other national
data privacy laws, it sets forth requirements related to notice, consent, data
processing, access rights, and data retention limitations. 110 Registration
with authorities and appointment of an official compliance officer are not
required however.111 Section 33 of the Hong Kong Privacy Law contains
provisions severely restricting the transfer of data outside of Hong Kong;
however, it has not yet been brought into force since its enactment. 112
Currently, cross-border transfer of personal data is regulated by general
Hong Kong law. 113
[44] In 2012 Hong Kong amended the Hong Kong Privacy Law to
strengthen restrictions on use of personal information. 114 Among the more
significant changes, the amendments imposed additional restrictions on
direct marketing activities.115 The amendments require consent from the
data subject for: disclosure of any personal information, granting
additional enforcement powers to the Privacy Commissioner, giving data
subjects additional access rights to their data, imposing additional
regulations on outsourcing of data processing, and notably, providing
additional means for transfer of personal data under certain

109

See id.

110

See id.

111

See id.

112

Letter from Allan Chiang, Privacy Comm’r for Pers. Data, to Tam Yiu-Chung,
Chairman of Panel on Constitutional Affairs 5–6 (Jan. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/ca/papers/cacb2-790-1-e.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/7U6G-AVRJ.
113

See Rich, supra note 8, at 675.

114

See id. at 676.

115

See id.
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circumstances. 116 Data users seeking to provide personal information to
others for their direct marketing purposes must have consent confirmed in
writing. 117 Violation of these regulations subjects the data user to criminal
penalties including fines of up to HK$1,000,000 (US$128,966) and five
years’ imprisonment.118
[45] In December 2014, the Hong Kong Office of the Privacy
Commission for Personal Data issued the Guidance on Personal Data
Protection in Cross Border Transfer. 119 While not binding, the Guidance
is intended as a practical roadmap for businesses to prepare for upcoming
data transfer restrictions related to Section 33 of the Hong Kong Privacy
Law.120
ii. Hong Kong e-Discovery Pilot Scheme
[46] Practice Direction SL 1.2 (“Practice Direction”) provides a
framework for the reasonable, proportionate and cost efficient discovery
of e-data in litigation in Hong Kong.121 It applies to all actions where the
claim or counterclaim exceeds HK$8 million (just over US$1 million) and
“the case requires the parties to search a [minimum] of 10,000
116

Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 18, (2012) (H.K.), available at
www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20121627/es12012162718.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/P2GX-HLKK.
117

Id. § 35J (1)–(2).

118

Id. § 35J(5)(a).

119

See Press Release, Off. of the Privacy Comm’r for Pers. Data, H. K., PCPD Publishes
Guidance on Personal Data Protection in Cross-border Data Transfer (Dec. 29, 2014),
available at
http://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/news_events/media_statements/press_20141229.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/YVK3-YWBH.
120

See id.

121

See Rachel Teisch, A Game-Changer for E-Discovery in Hong Kong, XEROX (Dec.
14, 2014), http://ediscoverytalk.blogs.xerox.com/2014/12/17/a-game-changer-for-ediscovery-in-hong-kong/#.VSsZLvnF9tg, archived at http://perma.cc/VJ7P-Q4ME.
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documents.”122 Parties may voluntarily agree to these terms or the court
may use its discretion to impose the Practice Directions as well. 123 The
Practice Direction attempts to narrow the scope of what’s considered
discoverable, from the more broad Peruvian Guano “train of enquiry”
approach currently in place in Hong Kong. 124
[47] Under the new framework, parties are encouraged to cooperate on
certain preliminary matters prior to the initial Case Management
Conference including document retention policies, which categories of
ESI are to be disclosed and cost allocation. 125 Other topics for discussion
include potential methods for cost-efficient disclosure, such as concept
searching and technology-assisted review. 126 As part of a case’s early
preparation, the parties must serve a draft questionnaire called the
Electronic Documents Discovery Questionnaire (“EDDQ”), which must
be filed with the court prior to the first Case Management Conference. 127
The EDDQ aims to identify custodians, document types and preservation
methods.128
c. Depositions in Hong Kong
[48] In Hong Kong, voluntary depositions do not require participation
of a U.S. Embassy or Consulate and are often taken in hotels and
122

Id.

123

See id.

124

See Jessica Chan, E-Discovery in Hong Kong–a Transformation Underway,
LEXOLOGY (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=218f05b13e01-46c2-8a95-847bd8518941, archived at http://perma.cc/U4NW-RKX4.
125

See Teisch, supra note 121.

126

See id.

127

See id.

128

See id.
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offices. 129 In addition, “[t]elephone depositions are permitted.”130
3. Taiwan
a. Hague Signatory Status
[49]

Taiwan is not a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention. 131
b. Collection, Processing and Transfer of Data
for Purposes of U.S. Discovery
i. Current Taiwanese Regulations

[50] Taiwan’s Personal Data Protection Act—or Personal Information
Protection Act (“PIPA”)—“entered into effect in October 2012[,]” 132
regulates the collection, processing and use of personal data in Taiwan.133
PIPA applies to government and private sector entities in their handling of
personal data of people in the territory of Taiwan regardless of

129

Hong Kong, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, www.travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legalconsiderations/judicial/country/hong-kong-sar-china.html (last updated Nov. 15, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/4QB8-YFWH.
130

See id.

131

See Legal Considerations–Taiwan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
www.travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legalconsiderations/judicial/country/taiwan.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3S48-DMX8
(last updated Nov. 15, 2013).
132

See Rich, supra note 8, at 678; see also GREENLEAF, supra note 12, at 172.

133

See JAIME CHENG & EMILY CHUEH, Data Protection in Taiwan: Overview, in DATA
PROTECTION MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE 2014/15 (2014), available at
http://uk.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf
&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1247939871268&ssbinary=true,
archived at http://perma.cc/VHK6-4K9S.
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citizenship.134 PIPA requires data controllers to safeguard personal data
and prevent the unauthorized access, use or disclosure of personal data. 135
[51] Before collecting or processing an individual’s personal data the
data controller must provide the data subject with adequate notice,
including the purpose of the collection and their rights under PIPA. 136
Personal data is defined broadly to include everything from name and
genetic information to marital status and contact information. 137 Subject to
a few exceptions, written consent is required before processing personal
data.138 Under PIPA data subjects have the right to supplement and correct
personal information and can stop the processing or use of personal
information. 139 Third parties are permitted to process personal data under
PIPA but they must be supervised by the data controller as to security
measures, time period and usage of the data.140
[52] Under PIPA, the central competent authority may block the
international transfer of personal data by a data controller if:
1. The receiving country lacks adequate data protection
regulations,
2. The transmission involves major national interests or
3. The transfer is made through an indirect method in

134

See id.

135

See id.

136

See id.

137

See id.

138

See CHENG & CHUEH, supra note 90.

139

See id.

140

See id.
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order to evade the provisions of PIPA. 141
Violation of PIPA can incur criminal penalties, and is punishable by up to
5 years in prison and NT$1,000,000 (US$30,000).142
[53] Pre-trial discovery under Taiwanese law is covered in Item 4 of the
Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure, “Documentary Evidence.” 143 In
Taiwanese litigation, each party presents the evidence in support of its
case, not according to a document request but on its own accord or
possibly through a court order.144 Each party is under a duty to produce
documents referred to in its pleadings. 145 The penalty for intentionally
obstructing the use of a document by the opposing party by destroying or
hiding the document is that the court will assume the opposing party’s
allegation related to that document is true.146
c. Depositions in Taiwan
[54] U.S. depositions are permitted in Taiwan and litigants are
responsible for making their own arrangements for stenographers,
interpreters, videotape operators, etc. 147 Depositions in Taiwan are not
141

See Personal Information Protection Act art. 21 (2010) (Taiwan) available at
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0050021, archived at
http://perma.cc/5ECU-C6M5.
142

See id. at art. 41.

143

See Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure, Pt. 2, Ch. 1, § 3, Item 4 (2003); available at
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp?lsid=FL001362&beginPos=3
3, archived at http://perma.cc/AQ72-QC7Y.
144

See id. at art. 344.

145

See id.

146

See id. at art. 282(1).

147

See Legal Considerations–Taiwan, supra note 131.
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required to be held at the U.S. Consulate or subject to some of the other
procedural impediments found in other Asian countries. 148
4. Japan
[55] Japan has one of the most developed laws on data privacy and
handling of personal information in Asia. The Act on the Protection of
Personal Information (“APPI”) is the current governing law relating to the
protection of personal information, which took effect in 2005, providing
legislative framework for the handling of privacy legislation. 149 In
addition, the Japanese government is currently considering a bill that
would amend the APPI in order to modernize as discussed in further detail
below. 150 While providing a data privacy framework that is readily
comprehensible to the foreign attorney, Japan offers its own unique
challenges to the U.S. litigator due to its strict regulations relating to the
taking of depositions in Japan and the fact that it is not a signatory to the
Hague Evidence Convention.

148

See Gerber Scientific Intl., Inc. v. Roland DGA Corp., No. 3:06CV2024 (AVC), at *7
(D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2012), available at http://patentlaw.jmbm.com/Gerber.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/43PN-WGA9 (finding that deposition of Japanese witnesses should take
place in Taipei instead of Japan or the U.S. because Taiwan has far less procedural
impediments for depositions than Japan and traveling to the U.S. constituted too great a
burden on the Japanese witnesses).
149

Kojin jōhō no hogo ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on the Protection of Personal Information
(APPI)], Act No. 57 of 2003, art. 1 (Hōrei hon’yaku dētashū [Hon’yaku DB]),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=Act+on+the
+Protection+of+Personal+Information&x=29&y=10&ia=03&ky=&page=2, archived at
http://perma.cc/GY4M-CF3W (Japan).
150

Allison Bettini, Data protection 101: Seminar on Privacy Rights in Japan at the
GCCIJ, 18 June 2014, EUROBIZ (Aug. 2014), available at
http://www.arqis.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/2014-GCCIJ-Seminar.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/7QLC-RVDR.
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a. Hague Signatory Status
[56] Japan is not a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention. 151
Instead, discovery requests in Japan are governed by the Consular
Convention of 1963, a U.S.-Japan bilateral treaty, “applicable U.S. and
local Japanese law, and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (regarding transmittal of letters rogatory).”152 Further, because
Japan is not a party to the Hague Evidence Convention, obtaining
evidence in Japan “from an unwilling witness can only be achieved on the
basis of comity, pursuant to a letter rogatory.”153
b. Collection, Processing and Transfer of Data
for Purposes of U.S. Discovery
i. Current Japanese Regulations
[57] Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information Law (the
“APPI”) regulates the handling of personal information by any business in
Japan that holds personal information, with the exception of those holding
the data of less than 5,000 individuals. 154 The APPI is considered an
administrative law, meaning it empowers the various ministries and local
151

See Legal Considerations–Japan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
www.travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legalconsiderations/judicial/country/japan.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M8FL-NS9A (last
updated Nov. 15, 2013).
152

Id.

153

Obtaining Evidence in Japan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, available
at http://homepage3.nifty.com/nmat/obtaining_evidence.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/S9EP-E62K (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b)); 4
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 28.12[1] (3d ed. 2015);
BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL § 33-1 (2000); see also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 5, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
154

See Rich, supra note 8, at 676.
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governments to implement and enforce the APPI. 155 Like other basic
Japanese laws, the APPI is “framework” legislation and delegates
discretion to national administrative agencies and local governments to
develop implementing regulations to accomplish the purposes of the law
and enforce the APPI, requiring that businesses examine the guidelines
under all the jurisdictions in which they operate. 156 For example the
Consumer Affairs Agency (“CAA”) coordinates the government's data
protection policy and the following government decrees interpret the APPI
and provide guidance to the ministries: “The Cabinet Order on the
Protection of Personal Information;” and “The Cabinet Basic Policy on the
Protection of Personal Information.”157 There are at least forty guidelines
detailing specific obligations and recommendations for twenty-seven
sectors including for example, those issued by the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (“METI”)158 and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism. 159 It is important to note that many corporations
may be governed by more than one ministry, including for example banks,
which are governed by both the Financial Service Agency’s Privacy
Guidelines, and The Privacy Guidelines of the Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare with regard to their employees. 160
155

See MANGYO KINOSHITA ET AL., Data Protection in Japan: Overview, in DATA
PROTECTION MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE 2014/15 (2014), available at
http://us.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf
&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1247703603376&ssbinary=true,
archived at http://perma.cc/33GJ-8AK5.
156

See Rich, supra note 8, at 677.

157

KINOSHITA ET AL., supra note 155.

158

These are privacy guidelines that apply to most manufacturers and service industry
companies. (Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry and METI Notice No. 2, 9 October
2009) (METI Guidelines)
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/it_policy/privacy/0910english.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/F6LC-RYJD.
159

See Rich, supra note 8, at 677; see also KINOSHITA ET AL., supra note 155.

160

See KINOSHITA ET AL., supra note 155.
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[58] Under Japanese law, businesses must provide notice about the
purposes for which they collect and use personal information, 161 adopt
security control measures, respond to access and correction requests from
individuals and establish procedures for handling complaints. 162
[59] Under the APPI notice may be provided directly to the individual
or through a public announcement.163 Consent is not required, provided
the purposes of use have been previously specified (such as in a notice or
public announcement). 164 Most relevant in dealing with discovery
requests, a business must obtain consent to share information with third
parties—or provide the individual with the ability to opt out of such
sharing if such sharing was included in a previous notice and made part of
the stated purpose of use.165 A third party is any legal entity other than the
data controller and also includes affiliated companies of the data
controller. 166 The APPI does not distinguish between third parties in
Japan and abroad and does not impose specific requirements on crossborder data transfers.167 Entrusting data to a third party vendor or law firm
would not be considered disclosing personal data to a third party under the
161

Personal information is “information about a living individual that identifies the
specific individual by name, date of birth or other description contained in such
information.” Personal Information includes information that enables one to identify a
specific individual with easy reference to other information. See Sayuri Umeda, Online
Privacy Law: Japan, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacylaw/japan.php, archived at http://perma.cc/H9JM-R2EC (last updated Jan. 26, 2015).
162

Id.

163

See KINOSHITA ET AL., supra note 155.

164

See id.

165

See Rich, supra note 8, at 676–77.

166

See KINOSHITA ET AL., supra note 155; see also Article 23, APPI; section 224(1),
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Guidelines).
167

See id.; see also Rich, supra note 8, at 676.
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APPI, however the business operator “must exercise all necessary and
appropriate supervision over the trustee to ensure that the use of the
entrusted personal data is securely controlled” and has a statutory
obligation of supervision over the trustee.168
[60] Given the fact that the APPI is implemented by various ministries,
and companies may be governed by multiple ministries, “the correct
method of obtaining consent [varies depending] on the ministry that has
authority over the data controller's industry[–]”it is thus essential that the
applicable ministry guidelines be reviewed before obtaining consent. 169
For example, the METI Guidelines (Section 2-1-10) do not require written
consent and recognize implied consent on a case by case basis; whereas
the Financial Service Agency (“FSA”) Guidelines require consent to be in
writing (including electronic writing), and
[T]hat a data controller in the financial industry ensures
that the data subject acknowledges all of the following in
the data subject's written consent to third party transfer of
personal information: the third parties to whom the data
will be provided; the purpose of use of the third party; and
the content of the data that will be provided to the third
party.170
It should also be noted that industrial associations in Japan, as in many
Asian countries, such as the Japan Securities Dealers Association, have
also promulgated privacy regulations that do not have the force of law, but
they may provide for sanctions within the association and may be cited by
ministries when enforcing the APPI. 171
168

Data Protection Laws of the World, DLA PIPER 191–92, (last updated Nov. 27, 2013),
available at http://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZQXW5XB; see also KINOSHITA ET AL., supra note 155.
169

KINOSHITA ET AL., supra note 155.

170

Id.

171

See id.
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[61] In April, 2014, Japan’s participation in the APEC Cross Border
Privacy Rules (“CBPR”) system was approved. 172 The CBPR system
facilitates efficient operation of organizations’ consumer data protection
procedures across the globe, and was designed as a complement to the
EU’s system of binding corporate rules for cross-border data transfers.173
Japan is positioning itself to provide certification to any organization
wishing to become CBPR compliant.174
ii. Proposed Japanese Amendments
Relating to Data Privacy, Collection,
Processing and Transfer
[62] In an effort to keep Japan’s data privacy regime in step with recent
technological advances such as the storage and collection of massive
quantities of consumer data by businesses known as “big data,” the Diet
approved in January 2015 proposals to amend Japanese privacy law. 175
The amendment is expected to—among other things—permit the transfer
of personal information without the data subject’s consent, as long as the
172

See CROSS BORDER PRIVACY RULES SYS. JOINT OVERSIGHT PANEL, CROSS-BORDER
PRIVACY RULES SYSTEM; PARTICIPATION OF JAPAN, FINDINGS REPORT 5 (2014),
available at
http://www.apec.org/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/CBPR/20140430_CBPR_Japan_Final
_Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3HB5-JK2L.
173

See Taisuke Kimoto et al., Japanese Data Privacy Developments—Global Transfers
and Privacy notices code, GLOBAL REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT L. BLOG (June 2,
2014), http://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2014/06/articles/datasecurity/japanese-data-privacy-developments-global-transfers-and-privacy-notices-code/,
archived at http://perma.cc/C8P8-4TCB.
174

See id.

175

See Cabinet OKs Proposals to Amend Information Laws but Privacy Fears Linger,
JAPAN T. (Mar. 10, 2015, 11:03 AM),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/10/business/cabinet-oks-proposals-to-amendinformation-laws-but-privacy-fears-linger/#.VSko4_nF9Fq, archived at
http://perma.cc/4CDN-JE6N.
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data is scrubbed of names and other sensitive data, 176 establish an
independent data protection authority, and restrict data transfer to third
country deemed to lack sufficient data protection measures. 177 Specific
changes to the APPI addressed in the bill include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

•

176

A framework for the transfer of personal data without
consent as long as the data is sufficiently
“anonymized”.
Expansion of “personal information” definition.
Definitions for “sensitive information” or “sensitive
data.”
Multi-stakeholder process and self-regulation rules.
Establishment of a Privacy Commissioner to act as a
third party monitor and enforcer of the APPI.
Revision of the definition of “Entity Handling Personal
Information” to which the Act applies “will be revised
to adequately enhance the scope of the Act’s
application to include foreign entities.”
Provides “a legal basis for the third-party organization
to provide foreign enforcement authorities with
information useful for their enforcement under the
pertinent law and regulations.”
If the entities handling personal information transfer
Personal Data to a foreign entity, “such entity will be
required to take necessary action, such as conclusion of
a contract requiring the recipient of such Personal Data
to take the necessary and appropriate actions for the
safe management of the Personal Data.”
Defines various types of transfer of Personal Data,
including, (i) transfer to a foreign group company, (ii)

See id.

177

See Data Protected,
LINKLATERS, https://clientsites.linklaters.com/Clients/dataprotected/Pages/Japan.aspx,
archived at https://perma.cc/KEN9-4JQB.
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transfer to a foreign service provider, (iii) joint use with
a foreign entity, (iv) transfer to a nonaffiliated thirdparty entity, (v) transfer associated with business
transfer or merger, and (vi) re-transfer to an entity of a
third nation.178
c. Taking Depositions In Japan
[63] Taking U.S. depositions in Japan raises unique challenges due to
U.S. Japan Consular Convention article 17(1)(e), which makes it
necessary for all depositions to be taken at the U.S. Consulate—with strict
requirements. Litigators are urged to plan far in advance if taking
depositions in Japan. 179 The article provides:
Consular officers may:
(ii) take depositions, on behalf of the courts or other
judicial tribunals or authorities of the sending state,
voluntarily given.
(iii) administer oaths to any person in the receiving state in
accordance with the laws of the sending state and in a
manner not inconsistent with the laws of the receiving

178

Framework for Amendment to Japan’s Personal Information Protection Act,
JONESDAY (Aug. 2014), available at http://www.jonesday.com/Framework-forAmendment-to-Japans-Personal-Information-Protection-Act-08-28-2014/?RSS=true,
archived at http://perma.cc/R84Z-UP5E.
179

See Jeffrey Soble & Masahiro Tanabe, Conducting Discovery in Japan: Depositions,
Letter Rogatory, and Production of Documents, THE CORPORATE COUNSELOR (Sept. 1,
2012), available at http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/d77c1ac1-476f-404e-afc0ea05b656b733/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4079c9cd-ab82-429c-84e7f049b5d831ea/TheCorporateCounselor9-1-12.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8Q2XSNGD.
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state.180
Additionally, the Japanese government cannot be compelled to abbreviate
Japan’s deposition procedure. With very limited exceptions, depositions
must be presided over by U.S. consular officer and conducted at a U.S.
consulate or Embassy. 181
5. Singapore
[64] The primary privacy legislation in Singapore is the Personal Data
Protection Act of 2012 (“PDPA”), which took full effect on July 2,
2014.182 The PDPA is meant to regulate the collection and use of personal
information. The act imposes eight key obligations on data controllers
with respect to personal data:
1. Consent - data controllers must obtain the data subject’s consent
before collecting or using that person’s personal data;183
2. Purpose limitation - personal data can be used only for the
purposes that the data subject was informed of and that a
reasonable person would consider appropriate under the
circumstances;184
180

Consular Convention, art. 17(1)(e), U.S.-Jap., Mar. 22, 1963, available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20689661.pdf?acceptTC=true, archived at
http://perma.cc/5KB5-QJF5.
181

See American Citizen Service: Depositions in Japan, U.S. EMBASSY, TOKYO, JAPAN,
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/acs/tacs-7116.html#dep, archived at http://perma.cc/3AUKYMCT (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
182

See Personal Data Protection Act of 2012, Law No. 26 of 2012 (Singapore), available
at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3Aea8b8b4
5-51b8-48cf-83bf-81d01478e50b%20Depth%3A0%20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0, archived
at http://perma.cc/U8BG-7C6J.
183

See id. at s.13.

184

See id. at s.18.
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3. Notification - subject to limited exceptions, data subjects must be
notified of the purpose for the collection, use or disclosure of the
data prior to collection;185
4. Access - upon a data subject’s request, data controllers must
furnish to the data subject any personal information about the data
subject that is in the data controller’s possession and must disclose
to the data subject how that personal information was used or
disclosed within the past year;186
5. Correction - personal information must be corrected at the data
subject’s request;187
6. Accuracy - personal information must be accurate and complete at
the time of collection and when any decisions are being made that
might significantly affect the individual;188
7. Protection/Security - data controllers must make reasonable
security arrangements to prevent unauthorized access, collection,
use, disclosure, copying or modification of personal
information;189 and
8. Retention - data controllers must securely dispose of personal data
or remove the means by which the data can be associated with
particular individuals once the purpose for which the personal data
was collected has been met, or after any relevant legal or business
purpose no longer exists.190

185

See id. at s.20.

186

See id. at s.21.

187

See Personal Data Protection Act of 2012, Law No. 26 of 2012 (Singapore), at s.22.

188

See id. at s.23.

189

See id. at s.24.

190

See id. at s.25.
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a. Hague Signatory Status
[65] Singapore has been a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention
since 1978 and has made a reservation under Article 23 permitting it to
reject letters of request for pre-trial discovery. 191
b. Collection, Processing and Transfer of Data
for Purposes of U.S. Discovery
[66] Personal data is defined by the PDPA as data about an individual
who can be identified from that data by itself, or in conjunction with other
information to which the organization has or is likely to have access.192
With limited exceptions that do not appear to include U.S. litigation,
collection of personal data in Singapore is permitted only after the data
subject’s consent has been obtained.193
[67] Use and disclosure of personal data without the data subject’s
content are permitted if “the use is necessary for any investigation or
proceedings,” but the regulation does not indicate whether this exception
extends to U.S. litigation.194 A data subject may withdraw consent at any
time for collection, use or disclosure of personal data. 195 Transfer of
personal data outside the borders of Singapore is prohibited unless the
transferor has ensured that the party receiving the data provides a standard
191

See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, supra note 20.
192

See Personal Data Protection Act of 2012, Law No. 26 of 2012 (Singapore) at s.2,
available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3Aea8b8b4
5-51b8-48cf-83bf-81d01478e50b%20Depth%3A0%20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0#pr1-he-,
archived at http://perma.cc/9SF7-M5QG.
193

See id. at s.13.

194

See id. at Third Schedule 1(e), Fourth Schedule 1(f).

195

See id. at s.16(1).
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of protection comparable to the protection provided by the PDPA. 196
[68] Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Commission (“PDPC”) has
broad power to review and investigate complaints concerning access and
correction of personal data.197 Inspectors from the PDPC have the power
to enter the premises of a data controller in connection with an
investigation, with or without a warrant.198 Penalties for violation of the
PDPA can include one year in jail and fines ranging from $1,000 to
$1,000,000 (US$740 to US$740,000), though many offenses carry fines of
$5,000 or $10,000 (US$3,700 to US$7,400).199
c. Depositions in Singapore
[69] Depositions may be taken in Singapore after filing letters of
request with the Singapore Central Authority for the Convention. 200
Because Singapore has excluded Chapter II of the Hague Evidence
Convention, depositions through consular offices or conducted pursuant to
a commission are not permitted.201

196

See id. at s.26(1).

197

See Personal Data Protection Act of 2012, Law No. 26 of 2012 (Singapore) at s.50(1).

198

See id. at Ninth Schedule (2).

199

See id. at ss.51, 56.

200

See Legal Considerations–Singapore, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
www.travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legalconsiderations/judicial/country/singapore.html (last updated Nov. 15, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/6VNA-CN52.
201

See Authorities: Singapore, Hague Conference on Private International Law (last
updated Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=532, archived at
http://perma.cc/6BWH-ZPVU.
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6. South Korea
[70] Until recently, South Korea’s legal framework for conducting eDiscovery was viewed as undeveloped, as there were no laws specifically
designed to regulate the handling of discovery requests in Korea.
Currently however, there is a combination of a comprehensive data
privacy law and sector-specific laws that regulate the collection and use of
personal information in Korea. Together, these laws can present serious
challenges to practitioners wishing to take discovery in Korea.
a. Hague Signatory Status
[71] South Korea is a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention with
a qualified Article 23 reservation, pursuant to which discovery requests
must be made through specific, targeted Letters of Request. 202
b. Collection, Processing and Transfer of Data
for Purposes of U.S. Discovery
[72] South Korean law on discovery is still very much in development.
The law that is most likely to impact efforts to conduct discovery for
litigation in the U.S. is the Personal Information Protection Act (“PIPA”),
enacted in 2011. 203 PIPA is administered by the Minister of Public
Administration and Security (“MOPAS”), South Korea’s key data
protection authority. 204 PIPA’s stated objective is to bolster the rights of
Korean citizens and “to ensure the protection of South Korean dignity and

202

See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, supra note 20.
203

See Personal Information Protection Act, Mar. 29, 2011 (S. Kor.), available
at http://koreanlii.or.kr/w/images/9/98/DPAct1110en.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/BU89-R4CP.
204

See id. at art 9.
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values.” 205 The law rests on four key principles: “[g]oal specification,
minimum collection, accuracy of information and safe management . . .
.” 206 Under PIPA, the following guidelines should be observed when
seeking to collect and use personal information in South Korea:
•
•
•
•
•

Minimal collection of information based on consent;
Prohibition of personal information management for
other purposes;
Careful protection of sensitive information and unique
identifying information;
Guarantee of access to individual information; and
Prompt destruction of information that has met its
initial objective and/or exceeded its holding period.207

Other statutes that regulate the collection and use of personal data are
more specific to sectors of the South Korean economy or specific
industries, including the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret
Protection Act,208 and the Promotion of Information and Communications
Network Utilization and Information Protection (“IT Network Act”),
which regulates internet service providers. 209 South Korea’s Unfair
205

Major Functions; Personal Information Protection Act, KOREAN GOV’T PERS. INFO.
PROT. COMM’N, http://www.pipc.go.kr/cmt/english/functions/pipact.do, archived at
http://perma.cc/2BQD-TT56 (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
206

See id.

207

Id.

208

See Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act, Act. No. 911,
Dec. 30, 1961, as amended up to Act, No. 11112, Dec. 2, 2011 (S. Kor.), available
at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=316015, archived at
http://perma.cc/AU5H-M3JC.
209

See Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and
Information Protection, Act No. 6585, Dec. 31, 2001 (S. Kor.), available
at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN025694.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/2DET-9G6Z.
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Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act is typically used
by South Korean companies to prevent piracy, but observers believe that
the Act could be also used by Korean companies to withhold electronic
data in a litigation context. 210 To date however, there are no known
published cases in the U.S. where this statute has been raised as a bar to
discovery.
[73] Personal information or personal data in South Korea is defined
under PIPA as “the information pertaining to any living person that makes
it possible to identify such individual by his/her name and resident
registration number, image, etc. (including the information which, if not
by itself, makes it possible to identify any specific individual if combined
with other information).” 211 Sensitive personal information is defined
under PIPA as “ideology, belief, admission/exit to and from trade unions
or political parties, political mindset, health, sexual life, and other personal
information which is likely doing harm to privacy of data subjects, as
stated by presidential decree.”212
[74] Under PIPA, processing of data is defined as “the collection,
generation, recording, storage, retention, value-added processing, editing,
retrieval, correction, recovery, use, provision, disclosure and destruction
of personal information and other similar activities.” 213 This definition
encompasses virtually any activity necessary for the preservation or
collection of data for discovery purposes.
210

See Andrew Guy et al., E-Discovery in the Asia-Pacific Region, 5 INFO. L.J. (Autumn
2014), at 7, 9–10, available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=ST230002, archived at
http://perma.cc/EQX5-FEDX.
211

Personal Information Protection Act, art. 2(1), Mar. 29, 2011 (S. Kor.), available
at http://koreanlii.or.kr/w/images/9/98/DPAct1110en.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/LF3L-AP7H.
212

Id. at art. 23.

213

Id. at art. 2(2).
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[75] Cross border transfer of personal information is permitted only
after notifying the data subject and gaining her consent.214
[76] Processing or transfer of personal information not in compliance
with PIPA can result in fines of up to 100 million won (US$90,000) or a
ten year prison sentence.215
c. Taking Depositions in South Korea
[77] Voluntary depositions by private attorneys and U.S. consular
officers are not permitted of Korean or third country nationals (other than
U.S. nationals) in South Korea.216 Thus, willing witness depositions must
be undertaken pursuant to request by the Korean Central Authority for the
Hague Evidence Convention and in the context of the Republic of Korea
court system. 217
7. Malaysia
[78] The Malaysian legal system is a hybrid of common law, Islamic
law, and customary law. 218 Despite the common law component,
Malaysia has no formal framework for handling discovery. Malaysia does
214

See id. at art. 17(3).

215

See Personal Information Protection Act, ch. 9, arts. 70–73, Mar. 29, 2011 (S.
Kor.), available at http://koreanlii.or.kr/w/images/9/98/DPAct1110en.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/LF3L-AP7H.
216

See Legal Considerations–South Korea, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legal-considerations/judicial/country/koreasouth.html (last updated Nov. 15, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/EVV2-DC8E.
217

See id.

218

See The World Factbook: Malaysia, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html, archived at
https://perma.cc/5X84-FHAV (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
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have a data protection law that regulates the collection and transfer of
personal data: the PDPA 2010. 219 The PDPA is supplemented by the
Personal Data Protection (“Class of Data Users”) Order 2013 220
(“Classification Regulation”) and the Personal Data Protection
(Registration of Data User) Regulations 2013 221 (“Registration
Regulation”). As with any country, the most important step of taking
discovery in Malaysia is to become aware of the relevant laws by hiring
local counsel.
a. Hague Signatory Status
[79] Malaysia is not a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention,
though it is considering joining.222
219

Personal Data Protection Act 2010, Act. No. 709, June 2, 2010 (Malay.) available at
http://www.pdp.gov.my/images/LAWS_OF_MALAYSIA_PDPA.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/Z3NR-L28A. The penalty for non-registration is 500,000 ringgit
($139,000) and up to three years in prison. See id. at art. 16(4).
220

Perintah Perlindungan Data Peribadi (Golongan Pengguna Data) 2013 [Personal Data
Protection (Class of Data Users) Order 2013], P.U. (A) 336, Nov. 14, 2013
(Malay.), available at http://op.bna.com/pl.nsf/id/dapn9dmqa4/$File/Personal%20Data%20Protection%20%28Class%20of%20Data%20Users
%29%20Order%202013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6V6T-68DM. The Order
requires certain institutions, including banks, communications companies and insurers, to
register with Malaysia’s Data Protection Commissioner. See id.
221

Peraturan-Peraturan Perlindungan Data Peribadi (Pendaftaran Pengguna Data) 2013
[Personal Data Protection (Registration of Data User) Regulations 2013], P.U. (A) 337,
Nov. 14, 2013 (Malay.) available at http://op.bna.com/pl.nsf/id/dapn9dmq6k/$File/Personal%20Data%20Protection%20%28Registration%20of%20Data%20
User%29%20Regulations%202013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/83MV-2BJF. This
regulation establishes registration fees and sets the penalty for non-compliance with
certain provisions at 250,000 ringgit ($70,000) and up to two years in prison. See id.
222

See, e.g., Questionnaire of May 2008 relating to the Hague Convention of 18 March
1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (May 2008), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008malaysia20.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/9RAW-VYX2.
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b. Collection, Processing and Transfer of Data
for Purposes of U.S. Discovery
[80] Any effort to export data beyond the Malaysian border requires an
understanding of the Malaysian PDPA. The PDPA defines personal data
broadly as:
[A]ny information in respect of commercial transactions,
which
(a) is being processed wholly or partly by means of
equipment operating automatically in response to
instructions given for that purpose;
(b) is recorded with the intention that it should
wholly or partly be processed by means of such
equipment; or
(c) is recorded as part of a relevant filing system or
with the intention that it should form part of a
relevant filing system, that relates directly or
indirectly to a data subject, who is identified or
identifiable from that information or from that and
other information in the possession of a data user,
including any sensitive personal data and expression
of opinion about the data subject; but does not
include any information that is processed for the
purpose of a credit reporting business carried on by
a credit reporting agency under the Credit Reporting
Agencies Act 2010.223

223

Personal Data Protection Act 2010 s.4, Act. No. 709, June 2, 2010 (Malay.) available
at http://www.pdp.gov.my/images/LAWS_OF_MALAYSIA_PDPA.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/X6T5-EZWB.
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[81] The PDPA contains seven key principles which Malaysian
authorities expect parties seeking to collect data to abide by. Those
principles are:
(1) “the General Principle—” no processing of personal
data without consent, subject to certain exceptions
including legal obligation and interest of justice;
(2) “the Notice and Choice Principle—” parties must give
timely notice to data subject of intended use of data;
(3) “the Disclosure Principle—” disclosure permitted only
for the purposes for which disclosure was intended at time
of collection;
(4) “the Security Principle—” data user must take steps to
protect data from loss or misuse;
(5) “the Retention Principle—” data is not to be kept longer
than is necessary;
(6) “the Data Integrity Principle—” seeking party must take
steps to ensure data is accurate and up to date; and
(7) “the Access Principle—” data subject has the right to
access and correct her data.224
[82] The PDPA permits transfer of data beyond Malaysian borders if
the transfer is necessary for legal proceedings. 225 Currently it is not
known whether U.S. discovery qualifies.
[83] There is one known published case where a U.S. court analyzed
Malaysian secrecy law in order to determine whether to order production
of Malaysian documents in a U.S. court proceeding. In Gucci Amer., Inc.
v. Curveal Fashion, the Southern District of New York ordered the U.S.based parent of a foreign bank to produce documents from its Malaysia

224

See id. at ss.5–12.

225

See id. at s.129(3)(d).
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based subsidiary. 226 The plaintiff sought documents relating to the
Malaysian bank accounts held by the defendant by means of a subpoena
on the New York office of the defendant’s U.S.’ parent company. 227 The
U.S. parent of the defendant argued producing the documents would
violate Malaysia’s banking secrecy law, the Malaysian Banking and
Financial Institutions Act (“BAFIA”).228 The Court analyzed BAFIA and
determined the statute permitted disclosure in certain exceptional
circumstances, which were in fact present in this case. 229
[84] The Court went further and looked to U.S. law. In its analysis, the
Court applied factors from the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law and from Second Circuit case law. 230 Regarding the Restatement, the
court looked into:
(i) the importance of the documents or information
requested to the litigation; (ii) the degree of specificity of
the request; (iii) whether the information originated in the
United States; (iv) the availability of alternative means of
retrieving the information; and (v) the extent to which
noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with
the request would undermine the important interests of the
state where the information is located. 231

226

See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20834. at *1–5
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010).
227

See id. at *2–3.

228

See id. at *9–13.

229

See id. at *21–22.

230

See id. at *5 n.4.

231

Gucci, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20834, at *6.
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The Court then considered two additional factors from Second Circuit case
law: “the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom
discovery is sought[,] and the good faith of the party resisting
discovery.”232 The Court determined that the factors enumerated in both
the Restatement and Second Circuit law favor production of the
documents.233
[85] While the analysis in Gucci provides some guidance to litigators
seeking discovery in Malaysia, there are no published opinions in the U.S.
that analyze Malaysia’s PDPA as a bar to discovery. In the meantime,
practitioners should be prepared to comply with the requirements and
principles in the PDPA and consult local counsel when seeking discovery
in Malaysia.
c. Taking Depositions In Malaysia
[86]

Voluntary depositions are permitted in Malaysia. 234
IV. CONCLUSION

[87] The laws of Asian countries are unique to each individual country,
and are constantly evolving and changing. For the U.S. attorney,
therefore, it is essential that he or she consult with competent counsel in
the specific Asian country in which discovery is needed, and work with a
vendor familiar with that country to undertake the discovery process for a
stateside litigation matter. It is also essential that this consultation be done
early in the process, so the U.S. litigator can educate both the Court and
232

Id. at *6. (quoting Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
233

See id. at *21–22.

234

See Malaysia: Taking Voluntary Depositions of Willing Witnesses, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legalconsiderations/judicial/country/malaysia.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8YYY-ZAFZ
(last updated Nov. 15, 2013).
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his or her superiors on the process required in that country in order to
attempt to avoid the catch-22 problems related to non-compliance with
either a U.S. court order or Asian laws. In doing so, he or she may work
into the scheduling order adequate procedures and time. With the growth
of data and multi-national business transactions, these problems will
continue to expand, and it is essential the U.S. litigator be prepared to deal
with the evolving Asian legal landscape.
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